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While there has been a significant amount of research on transnational feminist activism at
the global level, many feminist transnational advocacy networks are mobilizing within world
regions. The lack of attention to the regional level has created a considerable imbalance in
research on transnational activism. This article's first objective is to define regional advocacy
networks (RANs) as a collection of individuals and organizations from the same world
region working together toward a common goal. The article's second objective is to
explore the conditions under which RANs are influential. We investigate conditions for
RAN success through a case study of an African network that hdped create one of the
world's most progressive treaties on women's rights, the African Union Protocol to the
Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. From an
analysis of primary sources and interviews with key participants, we suggest that three
factors are crucial for network success: whether a RAN builds alliances with key
politicians and civil servants, whether a RAN is able to participate in the decision-making
process, and whether a RAN's goals overlap with the target institution's priorities. The
broader implication of our study is that scholars seeking to understand the creation of
women's rights commitments, the diffusion of women's rights norms, and compliance
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with women's rights treaties need to look beyond the international and domestic levels of
action to include the regional level in their analyses.

I

n recent years, the study of tmnsnational nonstate actors has established
itself in the field of international relations (Keck and Sikkink 1998;
Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Tarrow 2005). This research provides
a significant corrective to the neorealist and neoliberal assumption of state
primacy in international politics. It also demonstmtes that transnational
feminist networks are agenda setters in arenas such as the United Nations
World Conferences. Yet, there is a disconnect between the literature on
transnational actors and current directions in transnational organizing.
Rather than primarily operating at the global level, many feminist
transnational advocacy networks are mobilizing within world regions and
are seeking to create, expand, and implement women's rights norms
through regional institutions. The lack of research on the regional level
has created a considerable imbalance in research on transnational activism.
This article seeks to improve the scholarship on transnational women's
rights advocacy by drawing attention to regional advocacy networks
(RANs). One objective is to identify what regional advocacy networks are.
We define RANs as a collection of individuals and organizations from the
same world region working together toward a common goal. Distinct
from global networks, RANs are more attuned to local constraints, such as
lack of political will from domestic governments and accusations from
local actors that women's rights activists represent "foreign" interests. Our
second objective is to explore the conditions under which RANs are likely
to achieve their goals. We argue that while global dynamics, such as the
United Nations' growing recognition of women's rights as human rights,
are foundational, more local dynamics are pivotal for RAN success.
Drawing on the social movement concept of political opportunity
structure, we suggest that RANs are likely to be influential when they
build alliances with opinion leaders in states and institutions, when they
have the ability to participate in the decision-making process, and when
their goals overlap with the target institution's priorities.
To demonstrate the importance of regional networks and understand the
conditions under which they are influential, we present a case study of an
African RAN that emerged in the late 1990s. Drawing from an analysis of
primary sources and interviews with key participants, we explore a RAN's
role in creating what is arguably the most progressive international treaty
on women's rights, the African Union's (AU) Protocol to the Charter on
Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Adopted
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in 2003, the Protocol on the Rights of Women goes beyond instruments
like the Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) by prohibiting female genital cutting, setting
a minimum age of marriage at 18, and declaring that women have the
right to contraception. The Protocol is also the first treaty in the world
to guarantee a woman's right to abortion. Concerned with government
failure to integrate international women's rights nonns and in response
to domestic perceptions that women's rights are 'Western" impositions,
women's rights activists and organizations from the African continent
funned a network that accelerated the drafting process, helping to
explain the timing of the Protocol's adoption, and expanded its content,
helping to account for the Protocol's more radical provisions. The
network's success depended on a combination of factors: the alliances
the network funned with key African leaders, institutional change within
the AU, and institutional priorities to promote gender equality.
This analysis has important empirical and theoretical dimensions.
Empirically, intraregional coalitions of women's rights activists are trying
a new strategy of regionalizing global nonns in Africa, Europe, and Latin
America. Theoretically, our emphasis on regional networks refines and
extends existing constructivist research on transnational actors and the
uptake of international nonns. We suggest that scholars seeking to
understand the creation of women's rights commitments, the diffusion of
women's rights nonns, and compliance with women's rights treaties
need to look beyond the international and domestic levels of action and
include the regional level in their analyses.

PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN'S RIGHTS
ADVOCACY
The transnational mobilization of activists - including women's rights
activists - has captured the attention of many international relations
scholars. In the 1990s, constructivists revived the study of transnational
nonstate actors, showing that transnational networks can effect
international and domestic change. 1 Subsequent cross-national statistical
research further suggests that transnational actors help states adopt
gender mainstreaming policies (True and Mintrom 2001). Transnational
1. Constructivism is an approach in international relations that, in contrast to a neoutilitarian school of
thought, emphasizes the social aspects of international politics. See Risse (2002).
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networks have also been found to influence international politics.
Transnational feminist groups, for example, helped put women's rights
issues on the UN agenda (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998;
Joachim 2003). These works demonstrate the limitations of presenting
states as solitary actors in world politics.
Recognizing that the power of nonstate actors is not limitless,
constructivists have also tried to identify how transnational networks
influence states and international institutions. The boomerang model
(Keck and Sikkink 1998) and the spiral model (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
1999) provide two elegant starting points. Both suggest that transnational
advocacy networks help strengthen international human rights norms by
persuading foreign governments and international organizations to
sanction noncompliant governments. These models tackle limitations in
sociological institutionalist work on the spread of a women's rights
"world culture" (Berkovitch 1999) by specifying mechanisms of change.
The evidence used to support the boomerang and spiral models' idealtypical portrayals, however, suggests that domestic human rights groups
achieve change primarily by alerting audiences in the West. Examining
only cases where Western audiences and actors were pivotal is problematic
because non-Western transnational networks also influence state politics.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink do allude to transnational nonstate
actors working within world regions such as Latin America (1998, 79, 80,
179-80), but the majority of research on transnational advocacy focuses
on global or Western-driven movements (e.g., Tarrow 2005). Aili Tripp
(2005) captures the problem well:
The term "transnational feminism" is sometimes used as shorthand for
Western involvement in and influence on feminist movements globally.
This is only one element of hansnational linkages, and one that is
increasingly diminishing in importance as movements in the South have
begun to claim much of the momentum of feminist and women's rights
organizing globally.
Indeed, one study on the number and location of international
nongovernmental organizations (INCOs) finds that the percentage of all
INCOs in the world that are based in the global South increased from
5% in 1953 to 23% in 1993 (Sikkink and Smith 2002). Scholars of
transnational activism are beginning to study networks in the South,
such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)
and Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) (e.g., Moghadam
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2005). Even in these works, the empirical and theoretical significance of
regional networks is overlooked.
Feminist scholars raise additional concerns about the representativeness,
accountability, and efficacy of transnational advocacy networks. Many
argue that power dynamics within transnational networks entail the
exclusion of particular groups and class interests; transnational advocacy
may represent only the viewpoints of middle-class intellectuals (Desai
2005; Mendoza 2002). How "women's rights" are defined, accordingly,
requires dissection to understand whose voices are included and whose
are excluded (Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Hesford and Kozol 2005). An
additional concern is that transnational activism can lead to unforeseen
backlash and complications, a point that we return to in the next section.
Last, feminist scholars note that there are trade-offs between mobilizing
at the local, grassroots level and mobilizing through transnational,
professionalized NGOs (Alvarez 1999). The regional character of more
recent feminist movements, however, has not been adequately
considered. In sum, research on transnationalism by both international
relations and feminist scholars has overlooked the regional level.

A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY
To improve the study of transnational women's rights networks, we call
attention to the rise of regional advocacy networks (RANs), a particular
kind of transnational advocacy network (TAN). TANs, as defined by Keck
and Sikkink (1998, 2), are composed of "relevant actors working
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values,
a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services."
We define regional advocacy networks as a collection of individuals and
organizations from the same world region working together toward a
common goal. Like TANs, RANs may include international and
domestic NGOs, social movements, and individuals in intergovernmental
organizations and national governments.
Emphasizing that many transnational networks are in actuality regional
networks is not trivial. While the inclusion of women's rights issues in
the UN's agenda may help legitimize women's demands, there are
multiple and sometimes contradictory relationships between global and
more local efforts to promote women's rights. For example, local
women's advocacy groups in Nigeria and an international NGO, Women
Living Under Muslim Laws, asked Amnesty International and other
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international human rights organizations to stop petitioning Nigerian
government officials in the infamous "stoning" cases in 2002-3 (Imam
and Medar-Gould 2003). International petitions angered local officials
and gave many Nigerians the impression that local attempts to bring due
process to the zina cases masked secular interests. Scholars have discussed
similar cases where Western intelVention resulted in unintended,
negative consequences (see Farrell and McDermott 2005 on the
Feminist Majority in Afghanistan).
We do not wish to perpetuate a dichotomy between 'Western" and
"African" women's rights activists because activists within a single
country or world region are not uniformly alike. There are many kinds of
feminisms at the local, national, and global levels (Basu 1995). Nor do
we wish to portray the relationships between networks as static, zero-sum,
or unidirectional. Regional advocacy networks may collaborate well with
Western-based networks. Actors in regional networks may feel at the
same time that they benefit and suffer from the efforts of other actors and
networks. Several scholars have already articulated these points well
(Narayan 1997; Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001), recognition of
which could better inform research on transnational activism.
In contrast to perspectives that emphasize the subjugation of nonWesterners under a global "legal orthodoxy" (Dezalay and Garth 2002),
we believe that activists in developing countries adopt legal advocacy
tactics based on their own situations and beliefS. Women's activists in
developing countries are not just norm takers but are proactive agents
responding to local and global contexts. Women's activists within a single
world region might perceive common challenges for changing women's
lives, creating a starting point for cross-national collaboration. For example,
Susanna Wing (2002) echoes a point commonly made on women's
activists in Africa when she notes that Malian women are criticized as
'Westernized" by their compatriots for mentioning the UN Conference on
Women in Beijing. Such criticisms have led many women's rights activists
to reconsider the usefulness of drawing on Western or "global" norms.
Conditions for RAN Influence

Of several important questions that could be asked about regional advocacy
(see the conclusion), we focus on the question of the conditions under
which RANs are likely to exert influence. Research on transnational
mobilization employs the concept of political opportunity structure from
social movement theory (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker
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and Sikkink 2002; Joachim 2003), which we adopt here. In general,
changes in opportunity structures can account for movement outcomes
over time and space (McAdam 1996, 27).
One aspect of the political opportunity structure is the relative openness
of the political system. The importance of access for nonstate actors has
been noted in international relations scholarship. Research on the UN's
involvement in the advancement of women consistently points to the
importance of women's NCO access to UN structures (Clark, Friedman,
and Hochstetler 1998; Winslow 1995). Within international
organizations, non state actors' ability to participate, determined by
official and unofficial rules, can be crucial. Alliances with powerful
leaders are a second important aspect of political opportunity (McAdam
1996). Alliances may help outsiders get specific issues on the agenda at
international meetings. The presence of alliances may be observed by
matching the rhetoric of leaders with that of issue-based advocates.
The presence of alliances may also be discovered by examining which
countries propose treaty promulgation, amendment, and adoption.
Social movement scholars identify the stability of elite alignments as a
third aspect of the political opportunity structure. Shifting alliances
among elites may provide networks the chance to gain leverage.
Relatedly, state actors' unfamiliarity with the issues at hand may create a
window of opportunity for nonstate actors. Fourth, institutional priorities
and rules also affect the political opportunity structure. Sylvia Walby
(2004) argues that the European Union (EU) privileges economic issues
and intra-European integration processes, which creates both openings
and barriers for activists. The AU, in contrast, has placed greater
emphasis on peace, security, and development.
Thus, there are four hypothesized conditions for RAN impact:
l. improved access to the target institution will increase the likelihood of RAN
success,
2. alliances with key leaders will increase the likelihood of RAN success,
3. shifting alliances among elites will improve chances for success, and
4. shifting institutional priorities will help improve the likelihood of success.

EXPWRATORY CASE STUDY AND DATA

In the next section, we use the case of the Protocol on the Rights of Women
in Africa to explore the plausibility of these hypothesized conditions for
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success. As we analyze a single case, any conclusions will be suggestive rather
than dispositive. Nevertheless, a single case study allows us to trace carefully
the process in which RANs seek to influence politics. Primary source
documents from the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/AU and the
NCOs involved in the campaign serve as the main sources of data for the
study. These documents include multiple drafts of the Protocol and
markups of dmft texts from NCO meetings; OAU and AU reports from
experts' and ministerial meetings on the Protocol; transcripts of speeches
given at AU- and NGO-sponsored conferences; and reports from NGO
meetings. We use these documents to trace the development of the
Protocol and to tease out whether and how African women's organizations
influenced the text.
We supplement our analysis of primary source materials with data from
10 semistructured interviews with representatives of women's organizations
involved in the process. Five respondents respresenting four organizations
were directly involved in the RAN (the African Women's Development and
Communication Network [FEMNET1, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers
Association [EWIA1, the Inter-African Committee on Traditional
Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children [lAC], and the
African Women's Committee on Peace and Development [AWCPD]).
Four respondents included staff at the Economic Commission for
Africa's (ECA) African Center for Gender and Development, staff at the
AU's Gender Directorate, and a former representative to the Pan-African
Parliament (see Appendix). The interviews, nine of which were
conducted in the summer of 2005 in Addis Ababa and one of which was
conducted in the summer of 2006 in Washington, D.C., though small
in number, enabled us to check the inferences made from the analysis of
documents with actors involved in the process. The interviews were
conducted in English. Most interviews lasted about one hour. To meet
Institutional Review Board requirements, respondents cannot be
identified by name or in a way that compromises their anonymity. We
also draw on informal discussions with AU staff and representatives of
women's organizations and on secondary source material.
THE CREATION OF THE PROfOCOL ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN
IN AFRICA

In this article, we seek to identify what RANs are and to shed light on the
conditions under which they are likely to be influential. The first part of the
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case study examines the process in which the Protocol was created. It then
discusses the RAN's influence on the African Union. The last part of the
case study assesses the hypothesized conditions for network influence
and analyzes which conditions were crucial for RAN influence.
The AU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa on July 11, 2003. 2 The document covers
many women's human rights issues discussed in CEDAWand in the
Beijing Platform for Action but, unlike these international documents,
the Protocol also reflects specific forms of violations found in parts of
Africa. The 32 articles cover political, economic, and cultural rights
and address such topics as discrimination, harmful practices, marriage,
protection of women in armed conflicts, and health and reproductive
rights. Supplementing the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, the Protocol entered into force on November 25, 2005, 30 days
after the deposit of the fIfteenth instrument of ratification. As of March
2007, 20 countries had ratified the Protocol,3
It took eight years and the sustained attention of a RAN to move from the
initial idea of a Protocol to its formal adoption. The RAN brought together
lawyers, development experts, and human rights activists who sought to
create a regional human rights document that explicitly addressed women's
rights, reached or exceeded existing international norms, and specifically
dealt with issues faced by women in Africa. Regional organizations in the
RAN included the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices
Affecting the Health of Women and Children (lAC). The lAC is a group
of 28 national NGOs whose regional office is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Another important member of the RAN was the African Women's
Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), which has
national focal points in 22 African countries and a secretariat in Nairobi,
Kenya. A key early contributing member of the RAN was Women in Law
and Development in Africa (WilDAF). WilDAF has a regional office in
Harare, Zimbabwe, and has contacts in 31 African states. National
organizations like the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWlA) and
the Foundation for Community Development (FDC), which are based in
a single country but are concerned with broader regional issues, also
participated. Other critical members of the RAN, including Femmes Africa
2. Throughout the narrative, we refer to the OAU before July 2002 and to the AU after July 2002.
3. They include Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Cambia, Lesotho, Lih}a, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Togo, and
Zambia (African Union n.d.).
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Solidarite (FAS) and Equality Now, were international NGOs that operate at

both the global and regional levels.
The seeds of the Protocol were planted at a March 1995 brainstonning
seminar that brought together the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) - an intergovernmental organization within
the OAU/AU established by the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights - and various NGOs that would eventually crystallize into the
more cohesive RAN. The seminar was jointly sponsored by the ACHPR
and WilDAF'. Forty-four participants came together at the seminar to
discuss the need to make the African Charter "more responsive" to
women's rights (WilDAF' n.d.). Representatives of WilDAF' and other
women's rights organizations argued that the African Charter was
insufficient and affected women in contradictory ways (interview with
Melinda Adams, Addis Ababa, July 15, 2005; Wandia 2004). They
highlighted, for example, the fact that although Article 18(3) states that
"the State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against
women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the
child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions," the
Article immediately preceding it could be used to limit the protection of
women's rights (OAU 1981). Article 18(2) notes that "the State shall have
the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and
traditional values recognized by the community" (OAU 1981).
Participants claimed that the Charter's respect for traditional values could
be used as a basis for justifying the continuation of harmful traditional
practices, such as female genital cutting, widowhood rites, and
scarification. From the Protocol's inception, regional activists played a
critical role in advocating for a women's human rights document.
Although an initial draft of the Protocol was submitted to the OAU in
November 1999, it was not until two years later that an OAU experts'
meeting was held to discuss it (African Union 2002). These delays were
partly a result of the transition from the OAU to the AU, which was
marked by high levels of staff turnover. The OAU's first experts' meeting
was held in November 2001 in Addis Ababa. Representatives of
governments and civil society examined and commented on 27 articles.
Participants included official government representatives selected by
OAU / AU member states and representatives of organizations that had
OAU / AU observer status. The latter could observe but not participate in
the meeting's proceedings. Several members of the RAN, including
Equality Now, EWLA, FAS, FEMNET, lAC, and WiLDAF, participated
as observers. At the end of the 2001 experts' meeting, participants
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reached agreement on all but three articles. Article 6(c), which addressed
polygamy, Article 22, which discussed monitoring, and Article 26.5,
which covered the process for amending and revising the Protocol, were
bracketed for further discussion (OAU 2001).
In 2002, the OAU scheduled a second experts' meeting and a ministerial
meeting. It was forced to postpone them, however, due to lack of a quorum.
The delay meant that the Protocol could not be placed on the agenda of the
inaugural AU summit in Durban in July 2002. Three members of the
RAN, the AWCPD, FAS, and the African Centre for the Constructive
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), organized a meeting in Durban in
June 2002 to discuss the delay. This meeting resulted in the Durban
Declaration, which called on the AU to ensure the effective participation
of government experts - including women - in the second experts'
meeting, and to undertake "expedient adoption, ratification and
enforcement of the Draft Protocol"; the Durban Dec1amtion further
recommended that the AU take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate
ministers were able to participate in the scheduled ministerial meeting and
that the Protocol conformed to existing regional and international standards
on women's human rights (AWCPD 2002). Members of the RAN then
circulated the Durban Dec1amtion at the inauguml AU summit.
Concerned about continuing delays and weaknesses in the draft
document, Equality Now, FEMNET, and EWIA organized a meeting in
Addis Ababa in January 2003 that brought together representatives of a
number of African women's rights organizations to mark up the draft
Protocol and to discuss how to encourage a quorum at the expert and
ministerial meetings. Organizations who were present for this collective
rnarkup included the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights
Studies (ACDHRS), Akina Marna Wa Africa, the Association of Malian
Women Lawyers (AJM), the Association of Senegalese Lawyers (A]S),
Equality Now, EWLA, FAS, FEMNET, WilDAF, and Women's Rights
Advancement and Protection Agency (WRAPA). Equality Now played a
key role in coordinating the review of the document and in lobbying the
AU to hold the experts' meeting and to involve the RAN in the process
(Equality Now 2003, 7). Following the meeting, representatives of the
RAN met with AU officials, urging them to organize meetings in March
2003, and lobbied ministries of justice and gender to ensure that the
meetings reached a quorum. In March 2003, a second experts' meeting
was finally held, which was immediately followed by a ministerial meeting
(African Union 2003a). Once again, African women's organizations, led
by FAS, convened a presummit meeting to develop an advocacy strategy
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and to lobby representatives of states and the AU during the second experts'
meeting.
The RAN's presummit meeting concluded with a reception for experts,
which provided activists with an opportunity to talk with them informally
immediately before the experts' and ministerial meetings. Members of the
RAN attended these meetings as observers and additionally lobbied AU
officials to strengthen the Protocol and to ensure that it was in line with
existing international standards. The ministers approved the draft Protocol
and passed it on to the Executive Council and finally to the AU Assembly.
It was then formally adopted by the Assembly Heads of State in July 2003
(African Union 2003b, 2003c). The RAN was pleased with the final
document. Equality Now's Faiza Jama Mohamed, for example, stated that
"the adoption of this Protocol marks a significant step forward in promoting
the rights of women within Africa and we hope lays the groundwork for
further gains for all women around the world" (Equality Now 2003, 7).
REGIONAL NE1WORKS' INFLUENCE ON THE PROTOCOL

While it could be suggested that AU member states and international
donors made the Protocol on the Rights of Women possible, the case
study shows that the women's rights RAN succeeded in creating and
influencing this sweeping document. More specifically, success involves
influence over several stages of policy activity. As Keck and Sikkink
(1998, 25) note, networks can influence 1) issue creation and agenda
setting, 2) institutional procedures, 3) policy change, 4) the discursive
positions of states and organizations, and 5) state behavior. The women's
rights RAN to date has exerted influence in the first four of these five stages.
As the preceding discussion indicates, the RAN was an early player in calling
attention to the need for a regional women's rights document. But the RAN
did more than raise the issue; it also made sure that the issue stayed on the
AU's agenda during a period of institutional change marked by significant
staff turnover and a large number of policy initiatives in the new
organization. The instability of DAU/AU staff made the RAN's role more
important, as members of the RAN provided continuity and support for
overburdened members of the Gender Directorate. Throughout the delays
that occurred during the transition, it was the RAN, not member states or
Western actors, that pressured the AU to move ahead with the Protocol.
The RAN not only influenced the DAU/AU's agenda but also affected
its institutional procedures. From the beginning, the RAN pressured the

RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA

463

DAU to include nonstate actors in the working group that wrote the first
draft of the Protocol. The RAN also lobbied for the inclusion of civil
society organizations in experts' meetings. When nonstate actors could
not officially participate in meetings, they attended as observers or, when
that was not possible, held parallel presummit meetings that allowed
them to lobby key state and regional decision makers.
Close textual analysis suggests that the RAN played a critical role in
shaping the content of the Protocol and in ensuring that it reached or
surpassed existing international women's rights norms. Members of the
RAN, including WiLDAF and the ACDHRS, were part of the initial
working group that met several times in 1998 and 1999 to draft the first
iteration of the Protocol, which was submitted to the DAU in 1999. At
the January 2003 meeting organized by Equality Now, members of the
RAN developed a collective markup of the Protocol, showing where it
was weak and/or fell below international standards. Women's
organizations had a direct impact on at least 12 articles. While
definitions of violence against women and discrimination against women
in the Protocol draw from UN women's rights treaties (Ebeku 2004), the
provisions on abortion, contraception, and the rights of widows, the
elderly, and disabled are innovative. Women's organizations suggested
that member states should be required to enact and enforce laws to
prohibit violence against women, which includes "unwanted or forced
sex" (Article 4) (Equality Now 2003). This is in the final document but
was not in the original November 1999 draft. The final version of the
Protocol calls for the prohibition of all forms of female genital
mutilation "through legislative measures backed by sanctions," whereas
the 1999 version does not specifically require legal action (Article 5).
The final version of Article 9 explicitly suggests that states use
"affirmative action" to ensure equal opportunity for women in the
political life of their countries. In addition to suggesting changes to
existing clauses, women's organizations also added new clauses.
Women's organizations inserted new clauses on equal representation and
on the reform of discriminatory laws (Article 8). They also were in favor
of adding five articles guaranteeing special provisions for widowed,
elderly, and disabled women (Articles 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24) (Equality
Now 2003). There is little evidence that member states or Western actors
initiated these changes.
The RAN's efforts to influence particular articles in the Protocol
did encounter resistance. The RAN initially asked that the Protocol set
restrictions on polygamy, but after two days of debates, the AU's experts
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and women's rights activists came to a compromise and agreed on a clause
stating that monogamy is the preferred form of marriage (Article 6[c]).
Polygamy, and marriage more generally, is an issue that African women's
rights activists have found particularly difficult to contest at the domestic
level. In contrast, articles on improving women's political representation
and guaranteeing rights to contraception and abortion were less
controversial. The issues that most challenge women's rights activists on
the continent are not necessarily the same issues that challenge women's
rights activists in other world regions.
The RAN not only influenced the Protocol but also targeted other
issues in the AU. This broader work influenced the discursive positions
of states and the AU on a wide array of gender equality issues. During
the transition from the OAU to the AU, the RAN lobbied regional
leaders to include a commitment to gender equality as a central
principle in the AU's Constitutive Act (Article 4[1]). This commitment
demonstrates the potential significance of discursive positions. Once
leaders had enshrined gender equality as one of the AU's constitutive
values, activists invoked Article 4( 1) of the Constitutive Act as they
lobbied for specific policies. Using this tactic, activists won leaders'
commitment to gender parity in AU decision-making positions, to a
gender quota for delegations to the Pan-African Parliament, to the
Protocol, and to the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa.
The Solemn Declaration, adopted by the AU Assembly in 2004, calls
on states to submit annual reports on their progress toward achieving
gender equality. It also requires the AU Commission to prepare a
report each year describing progress made in this area at the national
and regional levels.
The RAN also influenced the discursive positions of specific states,
pressuring them to adopt the Protocol, as well as other agreements such
as the Solemn Declaration. Many of the organizations that participated
in the RAN that pushed for the adoption of the Protocol fonned a
coalition - Solidarity for African Women's Rights (SOAWR) - to
pressure member states to ratify and implement it. To date, 43 countries
have signed the Protocol and 20 have ratified it. For those states that have
ratified the Protocol, it is a legally binding treaty. The reality, though, is
that the Protocol has weak enforcement mechanisms, and state
compliance is by no means guaranteed. Ratifying international
documents does not necessarily change state behavior. It does, however,
provide activists with standards to which they can seek to hold states
accountable and may serve as a step toward changing state behavior.
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CONDITIONS FOR REGIONAL NETWORK INFLUENCE
The proceeding section outlined the RAN's impact in four stages of policy
activity. The objective of this section is to explain how the RAN was able to
have this influence, particularly as it had not been as successful in the past.
Earlier, we hypothesized that the relative openness of the political system,
alliances with powerful leaders, stability of elite alignments, and
institutional priorities influence whether movements succeed or fail. In
the case of the Protocol, we find that the political opportunity structure
provided critical openings that activists effectively utilized to pressure
states and the DAU / AU to adopt the Protocol. In particular, elite
alliances, openings created by the transition from the DAU to the AU,
and a close match between the RAN's goals and the AU's priorities
contributed to the RAN's success.

Political Alliances
Activists fonned critical alliances with key African leaders, which played an
important role in the RAN's success. Ambassadors, foreign ministers, and
heads of state and government who draft and adopt AU policies are
overwhelmingly men. The RAN, therefore, needed to identify leaders
who would support women's rights at AU summits. Members of the
RAN worked closely with regional opinion leaders, such as South
Africa's Thabo Mbeki and Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade, to achieve their
goals. After attending the women's presummit meeting in Durban, for
example, Wade proposed the gender parity provision that called for the
selection of equal numbers of women and men to the AU Commission.
Discussing Wade's role, a FAS publication noted that Wade "used his
good offices to mobilize his peers to actively promote the objective of
gender equality. As a result of his sensitive advocacy, the President did
not face any opposition from other African leaders" (FAS 2004, 30).
In 2003, Mbeki, who was then president of the AU, oversaw the election
of equal numbers of women and men to the AU Commission and the
adoption of the Protocol. At the 2004 summit, Mbeki called for
the reintroduction of reporting mechanisms that had been dropped from
the Solemn Declaration.
Discussing the success of African women's networks in lobbying AU
opinion leaders, a staff member of the EGA's African Center for Gender
and Development noted:
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It was because they were very astute. These are women who are very
experienced, and they are politicians. They are politicians so they are
strategic and they lobbied individuals and ... identified the key players
among the heads of state, they identified them. They lobbied the
Chairman and they lobbied the regional leaders, they lobbied the opinion
makers in each region. They got their support of key people at the highest
levels (interview with Adams, Addis Ababa, July 27, 2005).

A fonner EWlA staff member similarly highlighted the importance of
lobbying key players:
At every summit, when women's groups go to AU summits and they lobby in
the corridors, they lobby the ambassadors, they really made a lot of effort over
several years and that backdoor lobbying, that backdoor advocacy, somehow
delivered at the end of the day. And in fact this was initiated by the
Senegalese president And in fact, you know, both were, the presidents
who proposed and supported it, the Senegalese president and the South
African president, they are also committed... But the thing is who
initiated it and it has been, you know, it has been pushed by women,
women's groups. But also this is not to minimize the credit that should be
given to the heads of state (interview with Adams, Addis Ababa, July 25,
2005).4

Women's rights activists in the RAN sought out and gained the ears of
individuals who had demonstrated a commitment to women's rights and
whose opinions carried weight within the region. This slmtegy and
collaboration represents a departure from the past where contact between
women's rights activists and regional leaders was more limited.
Openness of the Political System
The transition from the DAU to the AU opened opportunities for changing
institutional policies and nonns. Discussing why the AU has taken such a
progressive stance on gender issues - at least at the policy level - a
staff member at the AU's Gender Directorate compared the AU's progress
on gender issues to that of South Africa and Rwanda (interview with
Adams, Addis Ababa, July 19, 2005). The South African constitution is
widely recognized as one of the most progressive in the world on gender
equality. Currently, Rwanda has the highest percentage of female
legislators in the world. Both countries achieved these changes following
4. FAS awarded Wade and Mbeki the first African Gender Award in 2005 for their support of gender
equity measures within the AU (FAS 2005).
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conflict and regime change. Scholars have highlighted that political change
has frequently provided openings for women to challenge patriarchal
structures and to increase women's representation (e.g., Goetz and
Hassim 2003; Seidman 1999; and Tripp 2003). Drawing on national
experiences and women's success in demanding greater representation in
Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and elsewhere, activists
took advantage of the transition from the DAU to the AU to secure
greater commitments to women's rights. Activists emphasize that the
creation of the AU was critical to the development of regional gender
equity policies since it is easier to change norms and policies when
institutional rules and practices are in flux.
The decision to launch a new regional organization, which was
announced in 1999 at an Extraordinary DAU Summit in Sitre, Libya,
provided the RAN with an opening to push for a stronger commitment
to gender equality. The 2002 Durban Declaration, for example, states
that women's organizations were "convinced that African women must
seize the opportunity provided by the historical moment of the
launching of the African Union to ensure their full and effective
participation in its operationalisation" (AWCPD 2002). In addition,
proceedings from the 2003 presummit meeting in Maputo state that the
transition from the DAU to the AU "provided the opportunity for
women's organisations and networks to meet and discuss the pertinent
issues facing gender and women on the Continent and to develop
strategies and recommendations to address these issues within the newly
formed structure" (FDC 2003).

Institutional Priorities
The compatibility of the RAN's goals and the AU's institutional priorities
further contributed to the RAN's influence. The AU's desire to represent
the people of the continent translated into policies that offered civil
society greater input into AU policies. Discussing the more cooperative
relationship between the AU and civil societal groups, a staff member at
the lAC stated:
The Gender Directorate invited civil society about a month and a half ago to
input into this Solemn Declaration. African Heads of State made a Solemn
Declaration supporting gender and we decided that if we just leave them
after signing that paper, they are not likely to implement it. We'd better
design guidelines for implementation for them and tools to monitor the
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implementation. And [the1African Union invited civil society. We were part
of that process to design guidelines to monitor Heads of State implementing
the Solemn Declaration on gender. That is a change. That's a shift. The
OAU probably would not have invited you. You had to push yourself into
OAU. Remember we drafted a Convention and pushed ourselves into the
mouth of OAU. But now the AU on their own does the invitation and the
consultation with civil society. There is a great change. There is a great
shift. They consult with us and they take what we have said into
consideration. We sat with them deciding how to monitor. And that was a
big thing. (Interview with Adams, Addis Ababa, July 15, 2005)

The AU established a Gender Directorate that frequently holds
consultations on AU gender policies and invites representatives of civil
society to participate in these meetings. The Gender Directorate has also
collaborated with NGOs to cosponsor conferences. The AU and
SOAWR, for example, jointly sponsored a conference on the ratification
and domestication of the Protocol in September 2005. Though Winnie
Byanyima, the head of the AU's Gender Directorate, specifically refers to
the Solemn Declaration, her comments are equally relevant to the
Protocol:
The third and last point I wish to stress is the critical role of civil society in
this process. The SD is the labour oflove of African women's organisations.
Women spent many years asking African leaders to address their concerns
and to include them in decision-making. That is why in the first three ...
years of its existence, the AU has made land-mark decisions that have
made it a global leader in the promotion of gender equality. To maintain
and even increase the momentum towards gender equality, civil society
has to continue the critical role it has played in the past (Byanyima 2005).

To distinguish itself from its predecessor and to demonstrate its
commitment to representing the people of Africa rather than just its
governments, the AU has sought to work more closely with civil society
organizations and to improve its reputation on human rights. The goals
of the RAN, therefore, overlapped with those of the AU, which
enhanced the RAN's influence.
Alternative narratives would suggest that member states and Western
donors played a more important role than did the women's rights
network and that international norms of women's rights were essential.
Focusing solely on state actors does not explain the timing or the
expansive content of the Protocol. Indeed, state representatives to the AU
expressed reservations against several articles at the March 2003
ministerial meeting. While the RAN received support from international
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groups, such as the International Commission ofJurists, it was better placed
to addresses controversial issues, such as polygamy, abortion, and female
genital cutting, which pose difficulties for external activists accused of
imposing "Western" values. Without the RAN, Western-based networks
and international norms could not have gone very far.
The question we have sought to answer is why the RAN was able to
influence the creation of such a document. We argue that the political
opportunity structure affects whether RANs will be influential. Specifically,
the case study suggests that RANs will be influential when they have allies
within states, when they have the ability to participate in the decisionmaking processes of the institutions they seek to influence, and when their
goals match with the target institution's priorities. In this case study,
shifiing alliances among elites was not a significant factor.
None of this would have mattered, however, if the RAN did not have
strong national and regional women's organizations upon which to
build. The existence of national-level women's organizations enabled the
RAN to coalesce quickly to take advantage of the shifting opportunity
structure. The case study suggests that a propitious political opportunity
structure is important. For this to matter, though, actors must mobilize to
seize these opportunities. This is a single case study, and its conclusions
are suggestive.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: REGIONAL ADVOCACY
BEYOND THE AFRICAN CASE
This article has two major objectives. First, we suggest that regional
advocacy networks (RANs) are emerging as distinct, powerful players in
contemporary world politics. Our focus on regional-level advocacy
provides concrete causal linkages lacking in sociological institutionalist
research and tackles the lack of research on non-Western actors in a fairly
well-established literature on transnational activism. Second, we argue
that activists within the African continent took advantage of a propitious
political opportunity structure to pressure states to adopt the Protocol.
The transition from the OAU to the AU provided activists the
opportunity to push for stronger gender equality measures. RANs
mobilized quickly following the announcement of the transition to
secure a commitment to gender equality within the AU's Constitutive
Act. They then drew on this commitment to pressure states to adopt
specific gender equality measures such as the Protocol. The transition
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also opened additional channels for nonstate actors to participate in
regional decision making.
The implications of this research go beyond the African context. A
glance at various arenas of contemporary world politics shows that RAN s
are emerging in different regions and under different regional
opportunity structures. In Europe, a RAN campaigned for gender
equality within the European Union by using access to EU institutions
to expand gender equality rights. Although individuals do not have direct
access to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a women's RAN works
with domestic courts to refer gender equality cases to the ECJ (Tarrow
2005, 152). This strategy has been quite effective: Between 1970 and the
late 1990s, the ECJ reviewed 177 cases involving gender equality
(Cichowski 2001, 122; Tarrow 2005, 153).
In Latin America, women's activists have organized a series of informal,
intraregional meetings called Encuentros (encounters), which bring
together women to discuss the state of feminism and women's activism
in the region. These meetings provide an opportunity for activists to
participate in "periodic regional conversations" on such topics as the
state of feminism in Latin America, the value of autonomy, and who
should be allowed to participate in the meetings (Alvarez et al. 2003,
540). In contrast with the meetings organized by African women's RANs,
the focus of the Encuentros is not on influencing national and regional
policies.
A RAN in Latin America also contributed to the adoption of the 1994
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
against Women. The Convention has raised awareness about violence
against women and prompted the revision and adoption of national laws.
At the same time, there is little data that indicates that domestic violence
is actually declining in Latin America. Moreover, "some countries of the
region have treated the ratification of the Convention as a 'destination'
and not as a 'point of departure'" (Inter-American Commission of
Women 2001, 18). The Convention demonstrates some of the strengths
and weaknesses of regional women's rights documents and highlights
that adoption and ratification are just two steps in a long process of
changing behaviors.
Future research can more fully interrogate why RANs emerge when they
do and whether regional networks help countries comply with women's
rights agreements and domestic policies on women's rights. This will
necessitate a closer and more systematic examination of the relationships
among domestic state policies, national women's organizations, and
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regional advocacy networks. Nevertheless, our article demonstrates the
importance of a regional advocacy network in directing regional-level
awareness of women's rights. Women's advocates in Africa and elsewhere
are trying a new strategy: In addition to domesticating international
norms, they are regionalizing them.
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